Indeed, Iran’s entrance into the “traditional” Middle East conflict only serves to expand the reach of the crisis, more than from simply a geographic perspective.

What was once a relatively straightforward conflict over real estate has turned into a complicated war of religion, which comes on top of the other problems afflicting the region; natural resources and of course the issue of real estate which still lies at the core of the conflict.

But now, one can add the all explosive ingredient, if you will excuse the pun, nuclear weapons.

Until now Israel was the only country in the region armed with nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them. Now with Iran entering into the Middle East political arena, and given its ambitions to obtain nuclear capabilities, it opens up a whole new Pandora’s box.

A nuclear-powered Pandora’s box in the possession of the Islamic republic, and depending on which experts one listens to, the contents of which could become operational as early as 2010 or 2011. The danger, besides the obvious, is that of nuclear proliferation in the region. What will the reaction from other Arab countries likely be? Will Saudi Arabia and Egypt not want to follow suit?

Does adding nuclear weapons not just further complicate the peace process, if there is even such a thing left? Indeed, is the Arab-Israeli peace process, or what’s left of it, still salvageable? That question was raised this week by Aaron David Miller, a former Arab-Israeli peace negotiator and a former adviser to six US secretaries of State at a discussion held at the Nixon Center in Washington.

The reality on the ground in the Middle East today renders that question no longer pertinent, because the Arabs and the Israelis are no longer the only ones involved. Iran, through its alliance with Syria, its active support of Hamas and Hezbollah, as well as through its blatant animosity directed at the Jewish state, has become part and parcel of the Middle East conflict.

Additionally, in recent years the Middle East crisis has started to split into multiple sub-crises, like regenerating cells, each forming a new and more complex crisis.

Today it is impossible to talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict because it has split into two very separate conflicts: one between Israel and the West Bankers and one between Israel and Hamas who controls Gaza. Then there is the Israeli-Hezbollah dispute, the Israeli-Syrian dispute, and maybe even an internal Israeli-Israeli conflict.

“Rarely have I seen a situation more dysfunctional and complex,” said Miller, now a senior fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center and author of “The Much Too Promised Land.”

The expanding complexity of the crisis is making it all the more difficult to resolve as all the emerging sub-conflicts are directly interrelated, making it impossible to settle one without finding solutions to the others.

In Palestine “you have two polities, two sets of how to approach the problem with Israel. Unity between the Palestinians is unlikely. That in turn renders peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians unlikely.

And Israel, says Miller, is undergoing a transition. But at the same time, the country is more dysfunctional than it ever was in its history, with a “weak government.”

Then, as Miller pointed out, “You have Syria with one foot inside the peacemaking tent and one foot inside the trouble-making tent.” And if that were not enough, the Iranian element is added to the mix. As Miller pointed out,

“There will be no Israeli-Syrian agreement until the Iranian nuclear dossier is solved.” But how do you solve that issue?

There are three avenues, none of which are likely to lead to a conclusive peace agreement in the Middle East. First is if Iran voluntarily reneges on its nuclear programme; chances of that happening are about as good as an ayatollah becoming pope.

Second is if Israel destroys some of Iran’s nuclear making capability, move that would only amplify the crisis and augment the level of animosity between Iran and Israel. And it would not stop Iran’s march towards nuclear armament. It would only accentuate it.

Third alternative: accept a nuclear powered Iran, a move that is very likely to kick off a nuclear proliferation race in the Middle East, as mentioned earlier.

A brief apercu as to how more complex, sensitive and expandable problems in the Greater Middle East have become is demonstrated by a recent statement made by an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader that Bahrain, the smallest Arab country, was Iran’s 14^th province.

A problem that emerged at one end of the broader Middle East, in the Gulf, reached the other end of the region with Morocco breaking off diplomatic relations with the Islamic republic over those statements. Why is that worth a mention? Because Iran’s reference to Bahrain being a province of Iran is chillingly reminiscent of Saddam Hussein’s claim that Kuwait was Iraq’s 19^th province.

There are no indications that Iran is about to invade Bahrain, home to the U.S. Fifth Fleet, but as Miller pointed out, “If you ignore the past, the past becomes a cruel and unforgivable teacher.”

Claude Salhani is editor of the Middle East Times and a political analyst based in Washington DC