Russia prefers to maintain the status quo in Syria

Despite operating as allies in Syria and coordinating on multiple issues across the Middle East, the Kremlin remains more cautious than optimistic about the resilience of its relations with Tehran. Fuelled by ideological zealot of the Khomenist interpretation of Shiaism and sincere persuasions in capabilities to fix the region, Iran appears to Russia as a regional power with occasionally unmatched influence on the ground and within cabinets of countless official loyalists. Nurturing no illusions about persisting and boiling sectarian divides, and the durability of useful despots, Moscow strives to sustain defined areas of influence with Tehran as guarantees of its stable geopolitical outreach.
More than four years since Russia's rapid and unexpected involvement into the Syrian civil war, its initial endgame expectations still remain unclear. Despite benefits of significantly improved relations with major regional powers, lucrative trade deals and unhindered accesses to diwans across the Middle East, the Syrian campaign also elevated the Kremlin's status as a global power. In describing the risk Russia took in the Middle East, President Vladimir Putin noted that the outcome turned out to be bigger than he had anticipated. Although the gains are evident, it's hard to believe that the campaign was an unsubstantiated gamble and lacked initial arrangements with Assad's major supporter on the ground, Iran.
Many reports suggest that Qassem Soleimani, former head of the Al Quds force of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, played an important role in explaining to the Russian leadership how a series of defeats for Bashar Al Assad could be reversed. Whether credible claims or not, Tehran still played a powerful role in triggering Russia's entrance, while bilateral relations had witnessed unprecedented rapprochement and, in November 2015, Putin acknowledged that "Russia's complex anti-Daesh campaign in Syria would be impossible without Iran."
Persuaded by the likelihood of a favorable outcome, the Kremlin decided to proceed. Although striving to restore its former Soviet-era stronghold in the Middle East, Moscow realised that its presence within Syria would be both limited and boosted by Iranian entrenchments. Nonetheless, it would overall allow to reach out to all major powers within the region, including Israel and the United States, and undermine Obama's policy of isolation.
The strength of the Iranian influence in Damascus was evident to the Kremlin before the campaign. Ever since Assad took power and changed the framework of relations with Hezbollah and Iran in the early 2000s that was established by his father, Hafez Assad, sectarian politics and Tehran's role had been on the rise. Ranging from promoting the Khomenist interpretation of Shiaism among the state servants and local Alawites, recruiting foreign fighters, boosting viscous layers of cooperation between Syrian and Iranian militaries, diplomatic and economic exchanges - the Assad's regime was seen as an Iranian client that, nonetheless, lacked hard power to crash the rebellion. Whereas Moscow preferred to secure greater influence within Syria, it's still a debate of whether Russian leadership would have dared to put boots on the ground without Iranian backing.
Tehran's influence emerged as a hedge to Moscow's venture. On the one hand, it ensured that the campaign would be supported on the ground by the Iranian troops and their proxies, which would boost efficiency, spare military costs, and help to avoid possible quagmire like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On the other, Tehran's influence boosted the resilience of Assad's power domestically and in the long-term established Moscow as a lesser evil that is above sectarianism, strives to reach out to all sides across the region and has no friends or enemies, but pragmatic interests.
Sectarian politics are especially sensitive to the Russian policymakers. Traumatised by the mujahideen guerrilla in Afghanistan in the last years of the Soviet Union and prolonged wars in the North Caucasus - the Kremlin was concerned in 2015 and has been to these days about staying outside Sunni-Shia deadlock at any cost. For instance, Russian military police in Syria incorporates great numbers of Sunnis from the predominantly Muslim republics of Chechnya and Ingushetia in attempts to avoid stirring anti-Russian religious contention.
Rapid military advancements and diplomatic cooperation, shaped Russia's practical understanding of Iranian strategies in Syria and beyond. Moscow has realised that Assad's conquests solidified the regime grip on power and further boosted its dependence on Iran. Last February, Assad showcased his gratitude and championed the alliance with Tehran by making the first known official trip other than to Moscow since the civil war erupted. Iran was also recently allowed to lease parts of Latakia container port, build a $460 million power plant and keeps getting lucrative state contracts.
Syria is likewise perceived as one of the countries within the so-called "axis of resistance." In effect, Tehran is believed to be using similar tactics by fuelling political interpretation of religion, redrawing sectarian and ethnic maps in its favour and boosting dependence of local officials. The recent attack on the US Embassy in Baghdad could emerge as one of the examples of the outreach of such Iranian influence.
At this stage Russia believes that the Iranian entrenchment in Syria is too strong, while the benefits of constraining it would be lower than costs. Although Moscow hopes the post-conflict reconciliation to protect secularism and encourage political decentralisation, current realities suggest that such a scenario is no longer feasible. Despite deepening defense ties, Russia remains cautious about its relation with Tehran and, last January, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov even challenged the idea of an 'alliance' between the two.
Although the Kremlin understands the need for an actual political transition, reshuffling of the Syrian system is too risky and might undermine Russia's stakes. In effect, Moscow prefers to keep the status quo that would still allow it to project power across the Middle East and within Syria by sustaining defined areas of interests with Tehran, while avoiding confrontations and securing high levels of coordination. Such approach also allows Russia to protect its presence in the Latakia region, keeping a naval facility in Tartus and an air base in Khmeimim, and avoid getting into sectarian and ethnic tensions that might erupt again in the future.
Dmitriy I. Frolovskiy is a political analyst and independent journalist based in Russia