The storm had already claimed the lives of at least two people in China's Hainan and 16 people in the Philippines
asia10 hours ago
However, and this was the bad news from Pittsburgh, the leaders agreed to implement the framework in a way that was condemned to be ineffectual. They adopted a sort of peer-review mechanism, giving the International Monetary Fund a mere advisory and secretariat role. That mechanism made it unlikely, if not impossible, that they would have robust policy recommendations ready for an executable agreement by the Seoul meeting, to which they committed in Pittsburgh. Regarding this objective, the Seoul summit was a failure.
Given the G20’s failure to provide an effective mechanism for macroeconomic policy coordination, it’s not hard to envision that as deficit developed countries try to overcome their economies’ sluggishness while the surplus emerging economies stick to the export-led strategies that yielded them high growth and strong recovery, the global imbalances will widen again. Even worse, the imbalances may not widen again but for the wrong reason. What if each key player engages in a tit-for-tat strategy to undo strategies of its perceived competitors and in the end the imbalances don’t widen because economic growth and trade are destroyed?
There’s already evidence of the kind of contention that could lead to this worst-case scenario. For example, China is accused of being stubbornly attached to a weak renminbi policy to sustain its export-led growth model at the expense of other economies’ expansion and has become the chief target of punitive ideas. Bills in the US Congress to apply discriminatory import tariffs on China; imposition of capital-market restrictions to prevent China from purchasing US Treasury bills; countervailing currency interventions to upset China’s own intervention in foreign-exchange markets; and even outright suggestions to declare trade war with China — all are examples of ideas put forward by otherwise reasonable people.
The G20 did not provide a cooperative solution to the present dilemma because, again, they failed to deliver a practical strategy to honour the reasonable principle that all parties have a responsibility as well as a role to play, and all available policy instruments should be put to work.
The G20 failed because they didn’t trash once and for all the absurd idea that the correction of imbalances is fundamentally a G2, or US-China, issue.
Every significant economy — deficit or surplus — has not only a stake but also a responsibility for correcting the macroeconomic imbalances. This is clearly the case for Germany that has long incurred large current-account surpluses, not debated much before because they were disguised in the Eurozone’s nearly balanced current account. Germany must reduce its large surplus in a way that both helps correct the global imbalances and enhances the probability of recovery of its euro partners.
Japan is another large surplus country that must take an active part in the rebalancing, undertaking at last structural reforms that would make it less dependent on foreign demand to sustain its level of economic activity. And the same applies to emerging countries with large surpluses.
For very valid social reasons, China must seek to preserve its high rate of economic growth, which, by the way, is good not only for that country, but also for the world at large, and certainly for other developing countries. However, China must adapt its policies through a mix of structural reforms, more domestic investment and a more flexible renminbi.
Undoubtedly, among the largest countries, the US has the most difficult balancing act to accomplish. It must, on the one hand, escape the low-growth–high unemployment equilibrium now trapping it and, on the other, must undertake a practically unprecedented effort to correct the rapid expansion of its national debt.
The G20 has made confrontation more likely not only by failing on macroeconomic policy coordination but also by not delivering in its commitment to conclude the Doha Round in 2010.
Instead of getting the job done — referring to Seoul of 2011 as “a critical window of opportunity” — the G20 leaders might have actually closed the door for a successful conclusion of the round when most needed. The Seoul outcome is truly worrisome. Addressing the question of global macroeconomic imbalances in a cooperative way is the litmus test of whether the international community is capable of managing other imbalances of greater complexity, as economic and geopolitical power continues to shift substantially in the years to come. So far the G20 is flunking that litmus test.
Ernesto Zedillo is director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalisation and former president of Mexico
© 2010 Yale Center for the Study of Globalisation
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