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Daesh is rearing its ugly head in Syria again

The group's most significant attack anywhere in Iraq and Syria in at least a year took place south of the key gas town of Al Sukhna on 9-10 April, when Daesh set up multiple near-simultaneous ambushes and assaults on pro-regime positions, killing at least 10 soldiers - potentially many more.

When the American-backed Syrian Democratic Forces captured the village of Al-Baghouz in late-March 2019, Daesh's self-proclaimed "caliphate" came to an end. The largest multinational military coalition in modern history spent four-and-a-half years methodically defeating Daesh's control of an expanse of territory the size of Britain, stretching across Syria and Iraq. Taken together, the dozens and dozens of victories that got the Global Coalition to Defeat Daesh to the final battle in Al-Baghouz represented a tremendous military achievement. However, terrorist groups do not need territory to survive. In fact, Daesh and its predecessor movements in the Levant have thrived for far longer without territory than they have controlled it.
In the year since the fall of Al-Baghouz and the demise of Daesh's territorial "state," the United States and its SDF allies have adapted to maintain a new phase of pressure on Daesh. Having lost territory to control, some Daesh militants faded back into civilian communities and many others fled into unpopulated, ungoverned spaces from which they would regroup and sustain an insurgency. Countering this newly covert and flexible Daesh presents far more complex challenges than fighting a terrorist organisation operating in the open in clearly delineated territory. Challenging this evolved enemy requires deeper use of law enforcement tactics, intensive intelligence gathering, extensive aerial reconnaissance, and the frontline deployment of well-trained, versatile forces who are intimately familiar with their local operating environments. Though the Daesh threat remains ever present in US and SDF-administered areas of northeastern and eastern Syria, it appears to be both under control and being slowly degraded.
On the western side of the Euphrates however, in territories controlled - at least on paper - by the Syrian regime, the Daesh threat in the landscape and the response to it are markedly different. Over the past year, Daesh has found safe-haven and strategic depth within Syria's regime-controlled Badiya - the expansive central desert region encompassing much of Homs, northeastern Hama, southern Raqqa and western Deir Ezzour governorates. The threat posed by Daesh in the Syrian Badiya was made boldly clear in April 2019 - a month when Daesh killed at least 65 pro-regime personnel; when two entire battalions of the Syrian army vanished for 48-hours after being surrounded and besieged by Daesh; and a Russian patrol disappeared for hours after being chased into the desert in a complex Daesh ambush.
The intensity of Daesh attacks on pro-regime targets in the Badiya in April 2019 sparked a rare emergency meeting later that month involving senior officers from Syria's military and air force intelligence directorates, the Syrian army, the Russian military, Iran's Quds Force, Hezbollah and a number of pro-regime paramilitary groups. At the close of the meeting, participants agreed that what was needed was not a concerted campaign to defeat Daesh, but a strategy of containment. Days later, the reason for that became clear, when pro-regime forces in the Badiya were withdrawn and redeployed to Idlib, to launch a major offensive there.
In the year since that fateful decision was made, Daesh's position in the Syrian Badiya has gradually strengthened, as more and more pro-regime forces have been sent to Idlib and those who remained in the desert were increasingly ill-equipped to do much more than occasional patrols along key roadways. At no point in the last 12 months have pro-regime forces launched a single sustained and meaningful offensive against Daesh in the desert region where the terrorist group has so clearly established a new home. Despite losing personnel every week for the past year to Daesh attacks, the Assad regime has remained focused on other issues, not least conducting two months-long rounds of largely indiscriminate bombing campaigns on 3.5 million civilians trapped in Idlib.
As coronavirus restricts the pro-regime alliance's ability to deploy effectively, Daesh appears to be escalating its insurgency in the Badiya. The group's most significant attack anywhere in Iraq and Syria in at least a year took place south of the key gas town of Al Sukhna on 9-10 April, when Daesh set up multiple near-simultaneous ambushes and assaults on pro-regime positions, killing at least 10 soldiers - potentially many more. The scale of the attacks were also notable in that they attracted 36 hours of Russian jet and helicopter strikes - a clear sign of their unusual scale. They were also followed by several more substantial Daesh attacks on regime positions in northeastern Hama and western Deir Ezzour, as well as three or more deadly IED attacks.
The scale and sophistication of events last week indicate that it is just a matter of time before Daesh seeks to control territory again in central or eastern Syria. Despite the huge value of the Badiya to the regime (it holds the majority of Syria's gas resources, which in turn fuels the country's electricity sector), there is still no sign that it will receive the security investment it requires. It has been clear for years now that the Assad regime has neither the will nor the capacity to contain, let alone defeat Daesh. The ingredients that fueled Daesh's explosive expansion in Syria in 2013 and 2014 still exist today - many of them are substantially worse. There is no logical reason to expect the regime to do any better than it did then and therefore, the international community will, whether it wants to or not, have to do what it can to weaken Daesh's Syria-based capabilities itself. "Leaving Daesh to Assad, Russia and Iran" is an increasingly popular proposal in America these days, but given recent precedent, nothing could be more dangerous. -Asharq Al Awsat
Charles Lister is a senior fellow and Director of the Countering Terrorism and Extremism Program at the Middle East Institute