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Iran has a lot to lose in a conflict with Israel

The worst-case scenario is too dreadful to contemplate.

Up until December, an undeclared war between Israel and Iran could be glossed over as one of the many low-intensity conflicts going on in Syria. But the abrupt announcement by US President Donald Trump of a military pullout from the war-torn country has made Israeli aerial attacks, primarily on suspected Iranian and Hezbollah positions, impossible to ignore.

In the best-case scenario, this war of attrition involving Israel and Iran will redefine the contours of the Middle East's geopolitical landscape. The worst-case scenario is too dreadful to contemplate.

Before the US president shocked both Washington's friends and foes alike with his December 19 troop-withdrawal tweet, statements by the Syrian government and independent reports pointed to an Israeli offensive that was episodic rather than continuous. However, once the green light had been given for yet another premature US military retreat, the Israeli government, acting purely in its own interest, quickly turned up the heat on units of the Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its allies.

The spirit of bonhomie that had been generated by a previous instance of Trump's political immaturity - the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel's capital and the transfer of the US embassy from Tel Aviv to the contested city - is now almost gone. Despite their understandably muted reaction to the Syria pullout order, Israeli politicians and generals presumably now have a clearer idea of what it means to be at the receiving end of Trump's impetuous decision-making.

With the US leader's signal that it is time for him to fulfil his campaign promise to bring American soldiers home from what he and his fellow isolationists call 'the forever wars', Israelis have understood that along with America's Kurdish and Arab partners in the fight against Daesh, they have been left to pretty much fend for themselves, although, to be fair, their military and intelligence relationship with the Americans remains unaffected.

From Israel's standpoint, Trump's recent actions amount to more than merely an abandonment of allies amid an unfinished mission to destroy remaining pockets of Daesh and curtail Iran's 'malign influence'. Less than a year after his controversial Jerusalem move, signs of increasing rapport between him and one of its staunchest critics, Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, have laid bare a quirk of the US president that his erstwhile Israeli admirers probably find intriguing at best and dangerous at worst.

Even as Benjamin Netanyahu tried to persuade Trump to stop the gratuitous surrender of northeastern Syria to his strategic rivals, the Israeli prime minister telegraphed his intention to go on the offensive. "We will continue to act against Iran's attempts to entrench itself militarily in Syria, and to the extent necessary, we will even expand our actions there," he said. Since that warning, attacks by Israeli fighter jets on Iranian and Hezbollah arms depots in Syria have become a near-daily occurrence.

Although IRGC and Hezbollah fighters present in Syria pose a security threat chiefly to Israel as of now, once entrenched they would no doubt be capable of projecting power over a wide expanse of the Middle East. Conversely, a setback in Syria at this stage is likely to sap the morale of Iran's allies in other regional flash points, reverse the polarisation of Middle East's polities along sectarian lines, and improve the general security environment.

For Arab countries, there are many good reasons to stay out of the Israel-Iran conflict, but if its intensification adds to the pressure on Iranian, Hezbollah and other Shia paramilitaries to withdraw from Syria, the outcome will prove a welcome.

The departure of foreign fighters could be a blessing in disguise for Syria's President Bashar Al Assad as well, not only because it would mean an end to the ongoing Israeli violations of Syria's sovereignty but also due to the fundamental incompatibility between the secular ideology of his Baath Party and the conservative agenda of his wartime allies.

It is no secret that the Iran-backed groups are instrumental in defeating the Syrian rebels, Al Qaeda-linked groups and Daesh have convinced many secular soldiers and pro-regime fighters to adopt a more religious lifestyle. Additionally, the influence of Iran and its proxy fighters over the Assad regime acts as a convenient recruitment tool for Sunni militant groups and a major deterrent to Syria's eventual return to the Arab fold.

Finally, if the confrontation with Israel raises the cost for the IRGC and its auxiliaries beyond an acceptable level, it would probably strengthen the hand of Iranians who have loudly denounced their leadership's foreign entanglements during sporadic anti-government demonstrations. The forces that have a vested interest in Iran's expansionist policies - specifically, the Quds Force led by Qassem Soleimani, who reports directly to the Supreme Leader - are currently too powerful to be tamed by unarmed protesters. However, a humiliating defeat in Syria's crowded skies would be quite a different matter.

Thus far, there are no clear signs that Israel's military tactics are having their desired effect. But given the lopsided nature of the conflict, which coincides with a deepening domestic economic crisis, it is too early to rule out a reversal of Iran's fortune.

Arnab Neil Sengupta is an independent journalist and commentator on Middle East