Lockdown in Afghanistan

With the war getting bloodier by the day, withdrawal, the other option is presently not under consideration.

Under increasing pressure from its top military commander in Afghanistan to send more forces, Obama has to take a critical decision, that too very soon. With every new US casualty, the public opposition to the Afghan war is steadily rising. Only recently an attack on an outpost in Nuristan province in eastern Afghanistan left about 8 US soldiers dead. This is precisely why military strategists have been clamouring for more troops to cope with what they term are poorly manned holdings. US led operations in Afghanistan since 2001 are now nearing a thousand US fatalities. The recently leaked dismal assessment report by US Commander in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChrsytal has clearly outlined the need to boost troops, to the tune of 30,000-40,000. These extra forces are presumably sufficient at this point to cope with the insurgency.

But how does the US intend to cope in the first place? Apparently now after much deliberation, Washington, is toying with another approach to deal with the crisis at hand. While the word ‘crisis’ may not have yet entered the discourse on Afghanistan, it is an appropriate term to use in this case. The conclusion the White house has reached is that it is near impossible to defeat the Taleban militarily or politically. Surprise, surprise! The Taleban are probably having a field day celebrating the retreat of another Superpower in the same country whose rugged landscape bears witness to the defeat of the Soviet Army among many others. Since the Taleban are now publicly acknowledged by the US as a political force, they are to be dealt with politically. This would require a capable political leadership in Afghanistan that is able to wrest the nationalist card from the hands of the Taleban and affiliated insurgents. A difficult feat, since any government in Kabul at this time is likened to the devil’s advocate, a representative of the foreign forces, derided by the insurgents as occupiers.

The biggest political problem to date has been the legitimacy of the Afghan leadership. Perceived as a puppet regime of the US, the Karzai administration in its previous stint in power was more known for ineffective governance and mismanagement. It had successfully eroded the natural residual advantages of government by failing to stem corruption and provide economic opportunities for its people.

A stronger stand on demanding more resources from the international community and cleaning its own backyard of corrupt elements led to apathy and disillusionment among the people. Even the recent elections held in August did not help matters. Eclipsed with allegations of fraud, the elections only managed to create further instability. It has highlighted the question of legitimacy, the overriding issue in the complex intermeshing of geopolitics and security.

General McChrystal’s recommendations shift focus to redeploying troops around population centres. Wresting control of territory from insurgents or destroying their forces will now no longer dictate the Afghan stratagem. While security provisions remain pivotal to gaining popular support, it needs the vital life support only a strong government can give. While US may not have much choice among political leaders inside Afghanistan it should refrain from turning a blind eye to a repeat of past errors, irrespective of who comes to power. This should include complete intolerance of malpractice and making bedfellows with controversial warlords only for the sake of retaining a shaky throne in Kabul. While political hobnobbing with even the devil itself may be part of Machiavellian politics especially in a country like Afghanistan dominated by clan power structures, it requires dexterity and firmness, a factor missing hitherto.

Obama is yet to decide on the number of additional forces for the Afghan operations, however, he has indicated adhering to a middle ground where he will neither expand majorly nor cut down operations to specialised smaller counterterrorism operations. The danger in boosting US forces is likely to fuel further local animosity consolidating perception about the US intent to entrench presence and occupy 
their country.

In shifting deployment towards towns and cities, large tracts of countryside are left vulnerable and exposed to the insurgents. Not a feasible idea since insurgencies thrive best in rural-centric environments, complicated further by tribal and ethnic factors. The US military strategy may have overlooked the rural dynamics of tribal culture, but they are close to trapping themselves in ‘siege pockets,’ inviting offensive. Having crossed the eight-year mark this October, the military operations in Afghanistan are now in a vulnerable phase. This stage is deemed critical for the fate of the protracted engagement. McChrystal has already warned how the next year will determine the fate of the coalition forces. In that case, what can be done to regain the insurgent’s initiative? While withdrawal of forces is not the answer, neither is the retreat towards deployment around 
population centres.

The answer lies at the intersection of three vital configurations — political, military and economic — that must be in tandem to generate benefits. It will call for reappraisal of policies and redrawing battle lines. The enemy combatant at this point may be approached for reshaping alliances.

A major overhaul is required in mindset. It requires ferreting into directions that could lead to the breaking of the Taleban-Al Qaeda collusion, a marriage of convenience in the first place. It will be ignorant to suppose efforts at reaching out to the Taleban and Hekmatyar’s Hezb-i-Islami are not underway, yet, these are perceived to be tepid, lacking depth and sincerity. It will not be easy since the insurgency is in the ascendance and will demand a hard bargain. But it must be done. Involving the nationalist insurgency in dialogue is imperative to stabilisation in Afghanistan. The stability narrative of the region cannot be complete without the Taleban onboard. This should be the point for a revised doctrine, the key to solving the political and military lockdown 
in Afghanistan.

Faryal Leghari is Assistant Editor of 
Khaleej Times and can be reached at 
faryal@khaaleejtimes.com