Signal or noise: What does Russia's nuclear threat mean for Europe?

On February 27, in a televised meeting with Minister of Defence Sergei Shoigu and Chief of the General Staff Valery Gerasimov, President Vladimir Putin ordered Russia’s nuclear forces to adopt a higher level of readiness. This led to alarmed reporting in the West, as some journalists confused the status of the forces with a “high alert”, one they would adopt if Russia believed that a nuclear threat or attack was imminent.

In contrast, higher readiness than in peacetime is not a state of high alert or any indication of an attack. In fact, Russia’s nuclear forces were already at a higher state of readiness because they were conducting the Grom 2022 exercise, scheduled for this time of the year.

There is no evidence of any unusual activity by the Russian nuclear forces beyond this exercise.

In 2014, during its invasion and annexation of Crimea, Russian leaders used the same tools of nuclear signalling to tell the world: ‘we will do our thing and you will stay out of it – or else’.

It has long been an open secret that, during an all-out invasion of Ukraine, Russia would use nuclear signalling to deter the West. This has been implied in all major Russian security documents of recent decades (as this author explained in 2020). Nobody, at this stage, should be surprised by it.

Russia knows the West’s red lines, such as taking the fight to Nato territory. This is why French Foreign Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was equally clear in stating: “I think that Vladimir Putin must also understand that the Atlantic alliance is a nuclear alliance. That is all I will say about this.”

And there is nothing to suggest that Putin does not understand the implications of the statement.

One should not panic about what ‘staying out’ of Ukraine means for the West in practical terms: there are long-established rules on that.

In the Soviet era and the decades since, the West and Russia have supported different factions in conflicts without sliding into a nuclear war.

One of the most recent examples of this is the war in Syria, which officially involves militaries from both sides.

Neither sanctions nor arms supplies to one party violate the rules. In the case of Ukraine, it would be a violation of the rules for Nato combat forces to enter the war, be it in the form of aircraft or troops on the ground.

Enforcing a no-fly zone over Kyiv – as demanded by many Ukrainians – would constitute such a case. For this reason, Nato and the United States have declined to do so on numerous occasions.

Still, many in the West fear that Russia would have an escalation advantage over Nato, because the country possesses more modern and versatile non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Gustav Gressel is a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations’ Berlin office.